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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\VALTER H. HlTF, 
Plaintiff and RespondPnt, 
--Y~.--
ASSOCIArrlOX FOR WORLD TRAVEL 
EXCHAXGE and JA~IE~ F. KENNY, 
Defpn.Jants and AppPllants. 
Case No. 
911~ 
This action "·as brought as the result of an automo-
bile accident which occurred September :l, 1958, at the 
intersection of Eighth South Street and Fourth East 
~trt>t>t in Nalt Lake City, Utah. The arcident happened 
at about ;) :-l-0 p.1n. (R. ~7). 
The plaintiff was driving his rar east on Eighth 
South Street and the defendant James F. Kenney was 
driving a car owned h~T the defendant Association for 
\Y orld Travel Exchange north on Fourth East Street. 
At the t.ime of the arcident the defendant Kenny was an 
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agent of the other defendant, acting in the scope of his 
employ1nent. (R. 50). At the intersection there are stop 
signs regulating north and southbound traffic on Fourth 
East Street. The defendant Kenny failed to see the sign 
and was unable to stop the car driven hy him before col-
liding with the plaintiff's car at a point 17 feet -1 inches 
north of the south line of Eighth East, and 38 feet 6 inches 
east of the west line of 4th East: or at about the center 
of the intersection. (R. 50). 
The plaintiff saw the defendant's car at about the 
point where it was near the location of the stop sign when 
he observed the danger of the collision. He attempted to 
speed up to avoid a collision but \Yas unable to do so. 
(R. 69). 
As a result of the collision the plaintiff "Was thrown 
from his car to the street. He suffered a contusion to 
the left buttocks and acute strain of the lubo-sacral area. 
(R. 140). 
The plaintiff had a pre-existing condition in his back, 
consisting of a narrowing of the inter-vertebral space 
in the region of the fifth lun1bar vertebra; and he had 
sustained a previous injury to his bark in 1953 or 10;)-l-. 
(R. 142). 
This case was tried to a jury beginning on ).fay :20, 
1959, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendants in the an1ount of Thirteen 
Hundred Forty-four and 57,1100 Dollars ($1,3-1-l-.37) spe-
cial damages, and the sum of rr'wenty Thousand Dollars 
( $20,000.00) general damages. 
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Then'aftPr a ~I ot ion ·was made on behalf of the de-
fendants for .J udgrnent X otwithstanding The Yerdict Or 
In The Alternative A New Trial. This motion was de-
nied h~· the trial judge July 17, 1959. (R. 205). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE, UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE, AND IS 'THE RESULT OF PASSION AND 
PREJUDICE. 
POINT II 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9, 
IN THAT IT PERMITS 'THE JURY TO SPECULATE ON 
PLAINTIFF'S PROBABLE LOSS OF EARNINGS, AND THE 
INSTRUCTION IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES WERE 
UNBALANCED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS AND INFLUENCED THE 
JURY TO RETURN AN EXCESSIVE VERDICT. 
ARGlT:MENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE, UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE, AND IS 'THE RESULT OF PASSION AND 
PREJUDICE. 
POINT II 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
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Points I and II of necessity must be argued together 
because they are related to the same propositions. 
Appellants filed a timely lVIotion for Judgment Nat-
withstanding the Yerdict or For a New Trial. (R. 203). 
This motion was argued and denied by the court. (R 205). 
The grounds upon which the motion \Yas based are de-
tailed in the motion filed. 
Plaintiff Walter H. Ruf was taken to the L.D.S. 
Hospital after the accident. X-rays were taken and he 
was treated as an out-patient and vvas relea8ed to go home 
two and one-half hours after arriving at the hospital. 
(R. 73). 
Saturday and Sunday, Septe1nber 6th and 7th, he 
ren1ained at home, but went to work l\Ionday, September 
8th. He worked in the office and did no outside selling 
until September 17th. (R. 77). 
He was working for Schreyer Typewriter Company 
as a salesman, on a con1mission basis, ''"ith a guarantee 
of $250.00 per month. (R. 8-l-). 
Special damages incurred as a result of the accident 
include: Car darnage, $403.50; L.D.S. Hospital for X-
rays, $35.00; Dr. Allred, $35.00 ~ back brace, $19.50; and 
$36.50 to repair an adding machine that wa~ damaged; 
a total of $529.50. 
After the initial examination by Dr. Allred, Ruf dirl 
not see the doctor again until Septe1nber lOth, at which 
time his condition was improved, but he did complain of 
back pain. (R. 138-141). Frmn the date of the arcident 
·1 
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tmtil the time of trial, Huf :-~a". the doctor eight times. 
(It 1-ll). 
Dr. All n'd testified at trial that the accident did 
precipitate pain, but did nothing to injure Ruf's back, 
and all of the haek trouble was a result of a previous 
dPg-P~H'rative collapse of the intervertebral disc. Dr. All-
red testified that the condition which brought about the 
pain of whieh Ruf cornplained, existed at the tiine the 
accident occurred. (R. 152). The condition shown in the 
X-rays of Ruf taken by Dr. Allred showed onl~- a de-
generative condition of the back. (R.l.t~)). 
Ohsessity of plaintiff and his carrying heavy Ina-
ellines put an extra strain on his back and increased the 
degenerative process, and spinal fusion is necessary be-
rause of the advanced degenerative process. (R. 150). 
After the fusion operation, Ruf could go back to the 
same work as he had before and he would have no pain in 
the degenerated portion of the back. (R. L):2) . 
. At no ti1ne did Dr. Allred testify that the accident 
caused an~· aggravation of the pre-existing degenerative 
condition, but he stated that in his opinion the accident 
precipitated pain. There is not one iota of testi1nony in 
the record that the accident aggravated the pre-existing 
condition and Dr. Allred was careful in his testimony to 
clearly explain that the pre-existing condition was a de-
generative process, h1it no testimony "·as given that it 
wa:;; aggravated. 
A search of the record reveals no testimony on the 
part of plaintiff's doctor that thPre was any objective 
~~-mf)tom~ of disability. 
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Dr. Paul Milligan of Salt Lake who was called as a 
witness by the defendant testified that there were no 
objective findings of disability or limitation of motion, 
and that Ruf had normal motion of the back for his age. 
(R.164). 
The only evidence in the record is that Ruf had no 
objective disability or limitation of motion. 
Dr. Milligan went into detail explaining the degree 
of degeneration of the spine, and testified that there had 
been a collapse of the disc and that the last vertebra 
was resting almost directly on the sacrum. (R. 163). 
There is no question that ~Ir. Ruf had an advanced 
degeneration of a vertebral disc and that the condition 
of the collapse of the vertebral disc would cause pressure 
on the nerves and pain. 
There is no evidence that the accident in any way 
hastened the degeneration or aggravated the pre-existing 
condition of Mr. Ruf's back. 
It is significant that plaintiff's attorney never asked 
Dr. Allred whether or not there were any objective signs 
or symptoms of aggravation of the pre-existing condition, 
and never asked him if there had been any aggravation 
of the pre-existing condition. Plaintiff's attorney asked 
Dr. Allred only as follows: 
"Q. Well, do you have an opinion, Doctor, as to 
whether the accident in which :Mr. Ruf was 
involved on September 5, 1958, precipitated 
the syn1ptoms of whirh he now eon1plains ¥ 
A. I would sa~· I have. 
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(J. And what is yonr opinion? 
A. It is my opinion that the condition, the basic 
underlying condition existed prior to the acci 
dent. I-Iowever, it \nu; not causing pain and 
that the accident adually precipitated the 
~.nnptonu-; which he now has." 
There wa~ no testilnony at trial concerning any other 
injuries suffered by :Mr. Ruf, except Ruf's own testimony 
as to pain in the chest and some pain in the elbow, which 
have healed with no apparent disability or difficulty. 
There is no testiinony that these injuries necessitated 
any medical treatment. 
This court, in several cases, held that a verdict so 
excessive as to aJJpear to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion and prejudice, and the trial court abusing 
its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial, may 
order the verdict set aside and a new trial granted. Pauly 
1'. JlrCortliy, 1091-.-tah 431:184 P2nd 123. 
The court has quoted with approval the language 
of the Pauly r. ill cCarthy case. In the case of Stamp v. 
Un.ion Pacific Railroad Company, 5 Utah 2nd 387; 303 
P2nd 279, the opinion approved the statement of the law 
in the Pa11ly r. McCarthy case and quoted from that ca~e 
a~ follm.vs: 
"Attention is called to the language of this 
court in that (Pauly vs. :McCarthy) case as fol-
lows), at pages 434-6 of the Utah Reports and 
page 125 of the Pacific Reporter : 
'but from the language used in these and 
other decisions, a view developed that this 
f'ourt was powerless to interfere with a jury 
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verdict, no n1atter how outrageous. This view 
was exploded in the case of Jensen v. DP11ur 
& R.G. W.R. Co., 4-± Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, 
1192, where, after citing with approval manv 
of the cases above cited \Ye said: "still th~ 
jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled and 
unchecked. Hence the Code that a new trial 
on motion of the aggrieved party may be 
granted by the court below on the ground of 
'excessive damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice.' vVhenever that is made to appear, the 
court, when its action is properly invoked, 
should require a remission or set the verdict 
aside and grant a new trial." ' 
This court has held that it can and should grant a 
new trial if the verdict is so excessive as to show that it 
must have been n1otivated by prejudice or ill \Yill toward 
a litigant, or that passion such as anger, resentment, 
indignation or some kindred e1notion has so overcome or 
distorted the jury's reason that the verdict is vindictive, 
vengeful or punitive, it should unconditionally be set 
aside. TVheat v. D&RGWR Com pn :l.lf, 1 ~~ Utah -HR. ~:10 
P2nd 932. 
Appellants recognize that the l~tah Court recognizes 
two classes of cases: recognizing one class of cases where-
in a new trial must be ordered if the verdict is the result 
of passion and prejudice; and a class of cases whereby 
a remittitur is den1anded by the ends of justice. Pauly v. 
McCarthy, 109 rtah 431, 18-± Pac ~nd 1~:3: 1llorgnu rs. 
Ogden Union Dr pot, 77 Utah 5-U, ~D± Pae 2nd 5-11. Trord 
vs. D&RGWR Co., 96 Utah 56-l:. S5 Pac. 2nd ~:17. 
The Utah Court has long held that it may be proper 
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to onh•r a remission of the excess verdict where passion 
and prejudice \n·n· not necessarily present, but if pas-
sion and prejudice were present, a new trial should be 
granted. St-P Rleganti vs. Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 
;lS5, 168 Pac 266, and illcAffee vs. Ogden Union R.R. De-
pot Co., ():2 Utah 116, 218 Pac. 98. 
In the case of DHffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pall._!!, 118 Utah 82, 218 P2nd 1080, the Court said: 
"Previously decided cases are of little value 
in fixing present day standards or in assisting 
courts in determining excessive awards." 
This quotation was approved in the Stamp vs. Unvon 
1\tcific Railroad Company case, 5 Utah 2nd 387, 303 P2nd 
:2i9, and the court in that case in ordering a remittitur 
or a new trial stated: 
"Holding as we do, that the verdict is without 
all reasonable bounds for the detailed injury, we 
then have the duty of ordering a new trial, or 
ordering a re1nittitur. Since the jury's verdict can 
be of no help to us, we must exercise our best judg-
ment in arriving at a fair and just amount to 
compensate plaintiff for his injury." 
In that case quoted there was nothing for the court 
to base a holding of passion and prejudice except the 
amount of the verdict. 
As related in the opening portion of the argument 
on these points, the plaintiff suffered no back injury, 
only a claimed precipitation of symptoms. The back 
condition, degeneration of the disc, allowing the vertebra 
to collapse, was in no \YRY connected with the accident, 
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but existed prior to the accident. Admittedly, an opera-
tion, which would require a total of six months temporary 
disability, would restore plaintiff to a condition which 
was as good as before. The sum of $20,000 general dam-
ages and special damages of $1,344.57 is excessive. The 
verdict includes as special damages the cost of the back 
operation. Plaintiff's medical bills, not counting the back 
operation, total only $89.50, including X-rays and a back 
brace. 
Plaintiff was never hospitalized. He returned to 
work Monday after the accident and saw the doctor only 
eight times, including the examination by the doctor to 
prepare for the trial testimony. No specific treatment 
was given or required. Admittedly, the man required a 
spinal fusion operation to repair the degenerative dis-
ease that pre-dated the accident, and which was in no 
way related to the accident. by causation or aggravation. 
$20,000 general damages in such a case clearly appears 
to have been given as a result of passion and prejudice. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9, 
IN THAT IT PERMITS THE JURY TO SPECULATE ON 
PLAINTIFF'S PROBABLE LOSS OF EARNINGS, AND THE 
INSTRUCTION IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The third paragraph of the court's Instruction No. 
9 reads as follows: 
"If the impairment of earning capacity is 
permanent, then the period of computation of loss 
would be the time that it could reasonablY be anti-
cipated plaintiff would be gainfully ~mployed, 
which might but may not necessarily be for the 
plaintiff's full life expectancy.'· 
10 
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lt is t!w po~ition of the defendants that this portion 
of tlw instruction is prejudicial to them and wholly un-
~npportPd h:· the record. lt was excepted to in the usual 
form. (R.193). 
Defendants 1naintain t~mt this portion of the instruc-
tion permits the jnr:· to speculate as to the loss of earn-
ing capacity of the plaintiff, if they believe the impair-
tttt>nt, if an:·, was of a permanent nature; because there 
is not any evidence documentary or otherwise concerning 
the plaintiff's life expectancy or the period for which he 
might be gainfully employed. 
It seen1s obvious from the size of the award that the 
jur:· must have awarded the plaintiff part of that amount 
upon the basis of a permanent impairment. 
If this is the fact, the verdict and the judgment ought 
not to stand because it is inconsistent with the jury's 
award to the plaintiff of the cost of surgical repair. It is 
the testimony of plaintiff's physician that after six 
months following the surgical repair he recommended 
the plaintiff could return to his usual employment. (R. 
146). 
Dr. Allred, the plaintiff's physician, testified that the 
total cost of surgery, medical and hospital bills would be 
approximately $800.00. This amount was included in the 
amount of special damage awarded the plaintiff. The 
jury awarded to plaintiff the total amount which the 
court indicated it could award for special damages, in-
cluding past and future medical bills. (Instruction No. 
S. H. 37). 
11 
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It is generally the law, and has been so held by this 
court, that it is prejudicial error to give an instruction 
which has no foundation in the evidence. 
Ah' __ o-ag the cases so holding is fVilcock v. Baker, 238 
P. ~:}3, G5 Utah 435. 
This was an action for the purchase price of certain 
cattle, and the defense was that the plaintiffs had agreed 
to accept payment from a third party to whom the de-
fendant had sold the cattle. The verdict was for the 
defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed. 
One of the questions raised was as to the court's in-
struction that the plaintiff Liston was bound by the sub-
stitution of a third party for the payment of the cattle 
which were purchased by the defendant. There was no 
evidence to support this proposition and the court held 
that it was reversable error. 
On pages 254 and 255 of 238 P. the court had the fol-
lowing to say: 
"In the court's Tenth Instruction the jury 
were advised that, if they found that Don C. Lis-
ton was a joint owner of the cattle with Wilcock 
and that Liston authorized his co-plaintiff to eon-
duct and carry on the business with defendant 
relative to disposal of the cattle, then Liston would 
be bound by any agreen1ent of novation or substi-
tution which might have been entered into by \Vii-
cock." 
It is vigorously argued that the instruction was mis-
leading; that there is no issue made by the pleadings 
that Wilcock was an authorized agent of Liston; and 
12 
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that t!tPn' is no evidence in the record upon which such 
an instruction could be based. It is, therefore, strenu-
ou~ly contended that the giving of the instruction was 
prejudicial error, in that it permitted the jury to specu-
late upon an issue of fact which was not an issue made 
h~· the pleadings, and that to support such issue there 
wag no evidence had it been an issue within the pleadings. 
\Ve are of the opinion that the pleadings are sufficiently 
broad to include the issue of fact submitted. But not only 
must an instruction be within the issues joined and made 
h~· the pleadings, but it must likewise have as a basi8 
some testimony to support a finding by the jury upon 
the issue of fact submitted by the instruction. Davis v . 
. ~I idrale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 P. 7 4; Bank vs. Taylor, 38 
Ctah 516, 114 P. 529; Sagers vs. International Smelting 
Company, 50 Utah 423, 168 P. 105. 
\Yith respect to this instruction, the court continues 
in it~ opinion on page 255 as follows: 
"We are of the opinion that there is no evi-
dence in the record upon which Instruction No. 10 
can be based must be allowed; likewise that the 
giving of that Instruction permitted the jury to 
speculate upon an issue of fact in the absence 
of evidence to support any finding or conclusion 
of the jury thereon. \V e are also of the opinion 
that the instruction submitted an issue of fact up-
on ·which a finding might prejudicially affect the 
rights of the plaintiff Liston. In any event, there-
fore, the judgment against Liston will have to be 
reversed." 
Among the other cases decided by this court support-
ing the proposition that an instruction is prejudicial un-
!3 
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less there is some evidence in the record to support it is 
the case of Olsen v. Warwood, 255 P.2nd 725, 123 Utah 
111. 
The following general statement on this proposition 
from that case is as follows: 
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an 
instruction must be based upon evidence and that 
it is prejudicial error to submit a charged act of 
negligence to a jury for its consideration in the 
absence of evidence tending to support a finding 
that the act occurred. Smith vs. Clark, 37 Utah 
116, 106 P. 653; Griffin vs. Prudential lnsumilcc 
Company; 102 Utah 563, 133 P. ( 2d) 333 ; Kendall 
vs. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P.2d 183. Likewise it 
is well settled that the court may not permit the 
jury to speculate upon the evidence that a finding 
of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, 
guess or speculation." 
It is the position of the appellants that that portion 
of Instruction No. 9 to which exception was taken does 
violence to the rule announced by this court and was 
prejudicial in the extre1ne to the appellants and led to 
an unjustified and excessive verdict. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT'S INS'TRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES WERE 
UNBALANCED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS AND INFLUENCED THE 
JURY TO RETURN AN EXCESSIVE VERDICT. 
The instructions of the court on the question of dam-
ages were contained in Instruction No.8 (R. 37) ; Instruc-
tion No. 9 (R. 38); Instruction No. 10 (R. 39): and In-
struction No. 13. (R. 42). 
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Defendants and appellants contend that the court 
over-accentuated the matter of damages and that the 
instructions on the damage issues were repetitious and 
gave undue prominence to the claimed damages and in-
jury. 
rrhis case resulted in an excessive verdict and a point 
on this appeal, is that the verdict was excessive and 'l 
result of passion and prejudice. The giving of numerous 
instructions relating to the injury and damage sustained 
h~· plaintiff and respondent placed an undue emphasis up-
on the damage portion of the case; the instructions con-
tiwD:tiiy referr~ng to and repeating certain propositions 
H~ to damag-e:;; for which plaintiff eould recover. 
In~truction K o. 8 (R. 37) generally gave the Jury 
the proper instruction concerning damages plaintiff could 
recover. The court re-emphasized and restated in fol-
lowing instructions the elements and measure of damages 
stated in Instruction No.8. (R. 37). 
The instructions included several statements as to 
the recovery to be awarded plaintiff for general damages, 
and which were repetitious. Instruction No. 8 (R. 37) is 
n~ follows: 
"If you find the issues in favor of Mr. Ruf 
and against the defendants, it will be your duty 
to award to Mr. Ruf such damages as you may 
find from a preponderance of the evidence, will 
fairly and justly compensate him for any injury 
and damage he has sustained as a proximate 
result of the defendant'~ negligence. 
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"You may award such special dan1ages as you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence the 
plaintiff is entitled to. 
"Reasonable and necessary expenses for serv-
ices rendered by doctors, for x-rays, medicines 
and prescribed items such as a steel corset for 
the back, actually incurred by plaintiff or shown 
with reasonable certainly will be incurred in the 
future. 
"You should also award to ~Ir. Ruf such 
special damages as you find the plaintiff is en-
titled to for property damage to his automobile 
proximately resulting from the negligence of the 
defendants. 
"In awarding general damages, you are in-
structed that you should also consider the nature 
and extent of the injuries sustained by him; the 
degree and character of his suffering, including 
pain, discomfort, fear, physical, mental or emo-
tional distress, their probable duration and sever-
ity, and the extent to which he has been prevented 
from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as 
heretofore enjoyed by him, and any disability or 
loss of earning capacity resulting from such 
injury. 
"The law furnishes no way by which to mea-
sure what is reasonable compensation for mental 
and physical pain and suffering but it is left to 
the sound judgn1ent and descretion of the jury 
to determine from a preponderance of the evi-
dence what is reasonable compensation to com-
pensate plaintiff for any physical or mental pain 
and suffering he has endured or will probably 
endure in the future. 
"You are further instructed that you may 
take into consideration loss of horly efficiency, 
16 
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loss of enerp;y and other disabilities which plain-
tiff nmy have suffered or which he will probably 
suffer in the future as a proximate result of 
<lPfendant's negligence. 
"In determining general damages, you may 
also consider whether the plaintiff will probably 
suffer in the future pain and suffering, disability 
or loss of earning capacity resulting from such 
injury, and if you so find, award such damages 
as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff 
therefor. 
"Further of you find that plaintiff must 
undergo an operation made necessary as a proxi-
nlate result of defendants negligence, then the 
reasonable costs of such operation together with 
the full loss of earning capacity during such 
period of recuperation shall be added to any 
award given plaintiff as damages. 
"The total amount of special darnages as-
sessed for medical bills, x-rays, steel corset, prop-
erty damage to Mr. Ruf's automobile and contents 
shall not exceed $1,344.57 and the total amount 
of general damages assessed for pain and suffer-
ing, loss of bodily function and earning capacity, 
nw~- not exceed the sum of $45,495.02, being the 
amounts prayed for by plaintiff in his complaint." 
The court in the first paragraph of the instruction 
tells the jury that the plaintiff may recover for any 
injury and damage he suffered as a result of defendants' 
negligence and then in paragraph 5 of the instruction, 
the court explains general damages, including pain, 
discomfort, fear, physical and mental or emotional dis-
tress; their probable duration and severity and the fact 
that plaintiff can recover for the extent he has hePn 
17 
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prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life. 
In paragraph 6 of the Instruction 8 (R. 37), the 
court again tells the jury about recovery for physical 
or mental pain and suffering plaintiff has or will prob-
ably endure in the future. 
In paragraph 7 of Instruction X o. 8 (R. 37) the 
court again tells the jury about loss or disabilities plain-
tiff has, or will suffer in the future. 
In paragraph 9 of Instruction X o. 8 (R. 37) the 
court again discusses the matter of future pain and 
suffering, disability and loss of earnings. 
In paragraph 10 of Instruction No. 8 (R. 37) 
again it is stated the law as to general and special dam-
ages which may be recovered by the plaintiff. 
In Instruction No. 10 (R. 39) the court instructs 
the jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you find that 
plaintiff is entitled to recoYery, he is only entitled 
to such damages as \Yill reasonably and fairly 
compensate him for his injuries and pecuniary 
loss suffered or sustained by him as a result of 
the accident. 
''Sympathy for the plaintiff should in no 
manner influence your verdict. 
"The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence the amount 
of his injury and dmnage, reasonably and natur-
ally flowing frmn such injury. The burden like-
wise rests upon hiln, that is the plaintiff, to 
establish by a preponderanre of the evidence, 
18 
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the nature, ('~tarndPr, and ext0nt of his suffering 
and injuries, if any. 
"You are further instructed that plaintiff is 
not entitled to recover for any claimed injury 
or damage wh ieh is of uncertain, speculative, or 
doubtful nature. Tlwrefore, if the plaintiff s~1all 
haYP failed to prove an~, claimed injury or any 
claimed element of dmnage by a preponderance 
of the evidence, or if the evidence respecting 
an~.' such 1natters is evenly balan('ed, you must 
resolve sueh issue in favor of the defendant. 
"You are not allowed and 1nust not speculate 
as to the extent and nature of the plaintiff's in-
juries, hut if ~·ou find he is entitled to damages, 
he should be cmnpensated only for those injuries 
whieh yon find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence were directly and proximately a result of 
the accident complained of. A party is not entitled 
to recover for imaginary injuries or injuries of 
a type or nature that are not a result of the arci-
dent or injury complained of." 
This instruction in a great part again relates to 
the jury their duty to return damages for injuries by 
plaintiff, and specifically points out the right of recovery 
hy plaintiff for pain and suffering that would result 
from the claimed back operation. 
A~ to the right to rerover for future loss of earn-
ing~. the court covers that question of damages in In-
struction X o. ~ ( R. 37) in paragraphs 5, 7, 8, and 9. 
Loss of earnings is again covered in Instruction 
Xo. 9 (R. 38) in the opening paragraph and in sub-
parag-raphs 1. :2, and 3. 
1? 
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"If you find the issues in favor of the plain-
tiff and that he has suffered a loss of earning 
capacity as a result of his injuries. you should 
award him such amount as will fairly and ade-
quately compensate him for any loss of earning 
he is reasonably certain to suffer in the future 
because of such injury. In assessing such loss 
you should take these matters into consideration: 
1. If the loss of earning capacity is not total, 
it will be plaintiff's duty to minimize his damages 
by seeking employment in any work that he is 
capable of performing, and earning as much as 
he can, and you should make due allow·ance for 
anything that he can reasonably be expected to 
earn in the future. 
2. If the impairment of earning is not 
permanent, then the computation of damage must 
be based only on the period for ·which the tem-
porary loss of capacity is reasonably rertain to 
continue. 
3. If the in1pairment of earning capacity is 
permanent, then the period for computation of 
loss would be the tin1e that it could reasonably 
be anticipated plaintiff y;ould be gainfully em-
ployed, which might but may not necessarily he 
for the plaintiff's full life expectancy ... 
Instruction No. 10 ( R. 39) again refers to earning 
capacity h~T the staten1ent in the opening paragraph that 
plaintiff can recover for pecuniary loss sustained: 
''You are instructed that if you find that 
plaintiff is entitled to rerovery. he is only en-
titled to snell dmnages as "ill reasonably and 
fairl~T c01npensate hiln for his injuries and pe-
euniarv loss suffered or sustained hv him as a 
result ~f the arrident. ·· · 
:?0 
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ln~tr:wtion Xo. 13 (R. 42) again covers the matter 
of lo~~ of earnings in the second paragraph of the in-
struction: 
"In determining damages in respect to such 
1natters you are instructed that the plaintiff is 
not required to submit to an operation to relieve 
the condition of his back, but rnay continue 
through life in his present aggravated condition, 
if you find such to be the case, and recover dam-
ages for the same. I-Iowever, you may consider 
the likelihood of the performance of an operation 
and you may likewise consider the possibility of 
a re~sation of the pain as a result thereof. You 
1na:' consider the cost of such operation and the 
pain and suffering resulting therefrom and fi-
nancial loss in earnings as a consequence thereof, 
if any." 
In addition to the general instructions on recovery 
for injury including pain, suffering, mental suffering, 
etr., the court in its instructions emphasizes the damages 
to be recovered in event of an operation, and that damage 
matter is referred to in paragraph 9 of Instruction 
Xo. R (H. 37): 
"Further, if you find that plaintiff must 
undergo an operation made necessary as a proxi-
mate result of defendants' negligence, then the 
reasonable costs of such operation together with 
the full loss of earning capacity during such 
period of recuperation shall be added to any 
award given plaintiff as damages." 
The court again instructed about the operation In 
Instruction Xo. 13 (R. 42), second paragraph: 
"l n oetermining damages in respert to sueh 
21 
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matters you are instructed that the plaintiff is 
not required to submit to an operation to relieve 
the condition of his back, but may continue 
through life in his present aggravated condition, 
if you find such to be the case, and recover 
damages for the ~arne. IIowever, you may con-
sider the likelihood of the perfonnance of an 
operation and you may likewise consider the 
possibility of a cessation of the pain as a result 
thereof. You may consider the cost of such opera-
tion and the pain and suffering resulting there-
from and financial loss in earnings as a conse-
quence thereof, if any." 
The i~tstructions on damages unduly emphasize and 
are repetitious concerning the recovery for injury and 
dmnages. The court's instructions on damages repeat 
over and over again the matters for which plaintiff 
"'Nould be entitled to recover and it is to be noted that 
the instructions covering damages require four separate 
instructions, totaling five pageR of instructions upon 
that question alone. 
Appellants contend that the court committed error 
and over-emphasized the damage element of this case 
by the giving of the last paragraph of Instruction X o. 
8 (R. 37), setting forth the an1ount of dan1ages claimed 
by the plaintiff. The giving of the mnounts asked by 
plaintiff as damages is prejudicial and serves to over-
emphasize the ele1nent of damages. There is no necessity 
or requirement for the court to tell a jury what amount 
is asked by plaintiff and the telling of the jury of such 
amount of the prayer of the complaint serves only to 
suggest large figures and amounts to the jury. No need 
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is ~pn·~._,d by telling the jury the anwunt of the prayer. 
If at any tillll' a jury should return a verdict in excess 
of an amount prayed, then it is a law 1natter for the 
eourt. The prayer of the complaint is not a factual mat-
tPr for the jur:·, but merely a law matter in event the 
vPrdid should exceed such prayer. 
rrhe court has recognized that the continued repeti-
tion of instructions, and the giving of unbalanced in-
structions, unduly emphasizing one party's case is pre-
judicial error. In the case of Devine vs. Cook, 3 Utah 
2nd 13-t, 279 Pac. 2nd 1073, this court held that instruc-
tion~ of the trial court, even though correct in their 
rntirety as given, which were a continual repetition of 
instructions of one party's theory or claims, and which 
unbalanced the instructions in favor of the defendants, 
ronstituted reversible error. 
The court has quoted with approval the holding in 
the case of Sh-ields rs. Utah Light & Traction Cmnpany, 
n9 Ftah 307, 105 P2nd 347, wherein it was held: 
".The reiteration of given propositions to the 
jury in instructions does not have judicial ap-
proval, and the resulting emphasis on applicable 
laws favorable to plaintiff's side as the result of 
the continual reference and repeating of certain 
law propositions resulted in the unbalancing of 
the charge, and error." 
Appellants contend that the trial court in an attempt 
to clarify the issues of damages, gave undue prominence 
to those issues and the elements contained in the dam-
ageR. The instructions are lengthy, intricate, repetitious 
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and they are to appellants' disadvantage. By needless 
repetition on the issues and elements of damages, the 
court has lead the jury to believe that plaintiff was 
entitled to excessive damages. 
The instructions in this case are within the doctrine 
specifically approved by the court and quoted in the 
Devine vs. Cook case, (supra), and which opinion by 
the court cites the case of K eeshin Motor Express Co. 
Inc. vs. Glassman, 219 Indiana 538, 38 NE 2nd 847, as 
follows: 
"\Yith this situation it was incumbent on the 
trial court to clarify the issues without giving 
a21y of them undue pron1inence. This ·was not 
done. The Instructions as a whole are lengthy, 
intricate, repetitious, argu1nentative and confus-
ing." 
The language of the quoted case covers with dis-
patch appellants' view of the court's instructions con-
cerning the damages in this case. The damage Instruc-
tions Nos. 8 (R. 37), 9 (R. 38), 10 (R. 39) and 13 (R. -±2) 
are prejudicial to defendants because of undue emphasis: 
repetition and over-accentuation. 
CONCLrSION 
The appellants respectfully represent to the court 
that the defendants should be awarded a new trial or 
in the alternative the eourt should order a remittitur 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and reduce the judgment to a reasonable amount based 
upon the evidence of the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
520 ·Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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